Scottish Defence Policy #5: Review of "Towards a Defence & Security Strategy for an Independent Scotland"

paper by Commonweal

In 2017, think tank Commonweal published a paper by Garry Macdonald: Towards a Defence & Security Strategy for an Independent Scotland.

In the intervening 7 years, we've had a major European war, which is still ongoing, and which has highlighted changes in military technology, such as increased use of drones. There have also been changes in the geo-political environment: the world is a more dangerous place. So now is a good time to review the paper. Lots of it I agree with -- for example, that militaries are useful in combatting natural disasters, or that Scotland should have a security and intelligence agency -- so for brevity I'll be concentrating on where I disagree, and why.

Threat assessment

The paper says (p. 4):

It is a near-certainty that an independent Scotland would face no immediate military threat from any other state and therefore the threat to Scottish territorial integrity, in the near term, is extremely low.

I disagree. To illustrate this I'll consider a realistic worst-case scenario 10 years ahead. It almost certainly won't go exactly like this, but this is an example of the sort of thing that's plausible.

Realistic Worst-Case Scenario Timeline

2024 -- Labour win the general election, Starmer becomes PM.

2026 -- Due to exhaustion on both sides, there is a compromise peace between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine (minus Crimea and parts of the Donbas) joins the EU and NATO, and several European states discuss forming a European Military Alliance.

2027 -- President Putin dies, officially of natural causes. The new Russian leader is a nationalist hardliner similar to Putin, but more competent. He sets to rebuilding Russian military strength, and seeks closer relations with China.

2028 -- UK general election. Labour is beset by economic problems and scandals, but is re-elected on a wafer-thin majority. In Scotland all but 3 seats go to the all-party United For Independence coalition. Starmer refuses an independence referendum.

2029 -- Russia starts license production of the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter jet (the only non-Western stealth fighter). China and Russia collaborate on new variants, loyal wingman drones, and other weapon systems. China and Russia plan to mass produce cheap but capable weapons including a $20,000 suicide drone with a range of 1000 km and carrying a 50 kg of explosives.

2030 -- With his majority disappeared due to by-election defeats and defections, Starmer is worried he might not get his budget passed. He does a confidence and supply deal with United For Independence, in return for an independence referendum. China starts selling its J-20 to aligned foreign customers, including Iran and North Korea. It is speculated that future customers might include Pakistan, Nigeria, Myanmar (all of which already operate Chinese fighters), plus Iraq, Argentina, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

May 2031 -- Scotland votes by 59% to 41% to become independent. Independence day is set as 1 November 2032. Negotiations on the terms of independence and interim arrangements start. On the same day, Northern Ireland votes to join the Republic of Ireland and is quickly absorbed into that state.

1 November 2032 -- Rejoicing as Scotland becomes independent. Scotland immediately applies to join the EU, NATO and the European Military Alliance.

May 2033 -- The Conservative Party, led by Nigel Farage and Suella Braverman, wins the general election. During the election campaign, Farage made dark hints that "Scotland needs to be dealt with" and that parts of Scotland that voted against independence (such as the Borders, Orkney, and Shetland council areas) really belong to England.

Threats in the Worst-Case Scenario

In the above scenario, Scotland in nine years time faces 3 threats, in order of seriousness:

(1) a direct threat to its territorial integrity by a revanchist England

(2) a Russian-Chinese threat to Eastern Europe which may result of all of Europe being occupied or becoming puppet states

(3) an expanding network of Chinese-aligned state around the world, which will be of help to China if a global conflict breaks out, for example following a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan

Note that if we were instead to list these threats in order of probability, the order would be reversed. Imagine as a thought experiment if we we able to run history ahead 10 years from a starting point of October 2023, and we did so 100 times, resulting in 100 different futures:

• in roughly 90% of these futures, China will be seeking to expand its influence in the world at the expense of the West

• in roughly 60% of these futures, Russia will be looking to invade somewhere in Eastern Europe

• of the futures where Scotland becomes independent, in roughly 20% of them England will be seriously considering invading us, either a full invasion or more likely a partial one to gain control of Scotland's oil

Countering these threats

for as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be brought under English rule. It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom – for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself. -- extract from the Declaration of Arbroath

The most serious of these threats is a direct threat to our territorial integrity, i.e an invasion. The only power with a land border with Scotland is England; if anyone else wanted to invade, they'd have to go by sea and and an opposed amphibious assault is a difficult undertaking. Furthermore England has roughly 10 times the population and GDP of Scotland. For all these reasons, if we can cope with an invasion by England, we'll be able to cope with just about anything else that circumstances might throw at us. Therefore, regardless of how likely an invasion by England is, if we configure our armed forces to repel it, they'll also be able to repel other threats.

To counter an English invasion, Scotland needs a large and-well equipped army, with large reserves of trained soldiers. This would look very similar to the Finnish army. Because Finland has about the same population and GDP as Scotland, Scotland is capable of building something similar. (Note that this implies Scotland will have conscription, of which more later).

There's no point in Scotland trying to develop a large air force, as England (with 10 times the population and budget) can always build a bigger one. Instead it should concentrate on anti-aircraft weapons and offensive use of large numbers of cheap drones to attack military and logistic targets in England. It would also be useful for Scotland to have the capability to attack economic targets such as power stations, electricity sub-stations, oil refineries, etc. Destroy these and England doesn't have an economy any more.

Regarding the Scottish navy, again there is no point in trying to compete symmetrically with England in building large surface warships. Instead Scotland should concentrate on submarines, naval drones, and hit-and-run tactics. England being an island, it is vulnerable to having its sea communications disrupted, and it would be straightforward to lay influence mines on the approaches to its container ports and oil terminals. A naval invasion of Orkney and Shetland could be best countered by deploying troops there before the invasion happens, and attacking the invasion and supply convoys with land-launched anti-ship missiles and submarines.

A revanchist England may try to conquer parts of Scotland if they think they can easily get away with it. But they are much less likely to do so if they face heavy casualties, defeats and their economy in ruins.

If there is a Russian (or Russian and Chinese) invasion of eastern Europe, Scotland can contribute to the defence by having a large army and a large defence industry able to mass-produce cheap but capable (and often AI-controlled) weapons. The same goes for a generalised world war.

Recruitment and conscription

The paper says (p. 9):

The Scottish Defence Forces would comprise a mix of regular and reserve personnel.

The paper is arguing for a small volunteer army. I instead argue for a large army, similar to Finland's. A large army, provided training and equipment are good enough (and Finland's are, so Scotland's could be too), is obviously going to have more combat power than a small one.

About the only time you'd want a small professional army is for engaging in expeditionary warfare, like Britain's participation in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. But since that was a bloody stupid idea, and Scotland shouldn't be invading other people's countries, the necessity for a professional army doesn't arise.

Instead of expeditionary warfare, we should only fight when ourselves or our allies are attacked, or in extreme circumstances when parliament deems it necessary. Having a citizen army makes it very unlikely that parliament would approve of going to war except under very serious circumstances when the population is behind the war effort.

Recruitment would be open to any Scottish citizen over the age of 18 who is able to pass the relevant physical and mental aptitude criteria. Diversity would be encouraged to prevent the formation of a homogenous ‘white male’ military culture.

Discrimination against people on grounds of race or sex is both immoral in principle (and ought to be banned in the Scottish constitution), and bad policy.

Not only is it bad policy because in wartime the military is full of important jobs that need to be done well or people will die (and therefore you always want the best person for the job), but also in a wider sense. To understand this it's important to realise that war isn't just a contest of soldiers and machines, it is a contest of wills, both of soldiers and of populations. Some recent examples will make the point:

(1) in 2021 the Afghan National Army quickly capitulated to the Taliban, despite outnumbering them and being better equipped. This was because they didn't believe in their cause and the Taliban did.

(2) in 2022 Ukraine successfully repulsed the initial Russian offensive, despite Russia having superiority in numbers and equipment. This was because they were determined to fight for their country.

(3) in 2023 Ukraine, despite having a much smaller population than Russia, has mobilised more soldiers to fight. This is because Ukrainians are super-determined to fight for the freedom of their country, whereas Russians are mostly apathetic. Putin would like to order full-scale mobilisation, but fears it would be very unpopular.

So if a country is fighting a war it helps vastly if the population is infused with social cohesion, or patriotism, or asabiyyah, or whatever term you want to use; but if you say to some sections of society (such as men, or white people) that they are lesser and deserve to be discriminated against, you reduce social cohesion and therefore reduce military effectiveness.

Conscription, as well as creating a pool of trained soldiers, helps to increase social cohesion by having an institution that all Scots from all walks of life join and take part in, acting co-operatively to a common purpose.

Long Term Sleeper Agents

Scottish culture and English culture are similar enough that it would not be difficult for Scotland to recruit long-term sleeper agents in England, who could pass themselves off as English.

In the event of a war, determined people armed with sniper rifles, explosives, detonators, and AI-controlled semi-autonomous drones could cause a lot of havoc. Also it would be useful for people to make intelligence reports, which could be steganographically encrypted over the internet, of things like positions/movements of English military units. Agents could also provide safe houses. It may make sense to directly target the leaders of a revanchist England.

Unexpected threats

The paper says (p.5):

It is important to note that the potential for conflict between Russia and the West is only an extrapolation of the current geopolitical climate used as an example. As history has shown time and again, a state-borne military threat can emerge from unexpected directions. Therefore, what might appear as the most likely source of a conflict at a given point in time cannot be guaranteed as the one from which it will actually emerge. Likewise, it is important to note that Scotland’s own foreign policy stance, regardless of how benign or neutral it may appear, would not mean that its neighbours would follow suit.

To put it another way: We might not be interested in international power politics, but international power politics is interested in us!

If for example the UK or NATO was to become involved in an armed conflict with another country which possessed the capability to project power into the north European region, Scotland would be exposed to the risk of military aggression simply due its geographic proximity.

This is true, and it's why even in times of low perceived threat it is important to keep our defences up (in the most cost-effective way possible, of course).

If there is a sudden threat, a well-equipped army with lots of trained soldiers and reserves of ammunition cannot be created in a matter of weeks (for a start, everyone else will be wanting to buy military equipment too). Therefore it is vital that Scotland has trained reservists, and reserves of weapons and ammunition. In times of low perceived threat, it's reasonable to cut back on procurement of new weapons, and the term of conscription could be reduced to maybe 3 months, but stocks of weapons and ammunition must be kept. What we shouldn't do is scrap or sell our old weapons on the grounds that "we won't need them". Much of the equipment used in the Russia-Ukraine war dates from the 1960s and some is even older. For the same reason, factories manufacturing ammunition must be kept ticking over with low-rate production. These factories should be state owned as a privately owned entity won't have the right incentives to keep the capability to rapidly expand production.

The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated that many weapons from the 1950s to 1980s are still functional and deadly, and if they are backed up by cheaply mass-produced AI-controlled drones they form a foundation of an armed force on which to add smaller numbers of much more sophisticated weapons.

Scottish navy

The paper says (p. 11):

The Scottish Navy would have a number of frigates for contributing to international security efforts and providing a more robust defence capability when required. They would have a modular design, similar to the Danish Absalom-class, allowing them to be adapted for a number of operational profiles including anti-submarine, anti-air or sea lane control operations.

[...] The Scottish Navy would not initially require a submarine capability unless strategic circumstances change and warrant it, at which point procuring an advanced diesel-propulsion model would be an advisable option.

I disagree. Frigates are expensive and vulnerable. Submarines (while equally expensive) are a good deal less vulnerable, because they are stealthy: you can't attack what you can't detect. Enemy submarines can best be dealt with by our own submarines plus surface and underwater drones (which may be launched from a frigate acting as a mothership).

Submarines are also useful for covert operations (destroying pipelines like Nord Stream 2) and infiltrating and exfiltrating special forces.

I suggest Scotland have a fleet of 3 submarines, maybe 1 frigate, and various small craft capable of patrol and attack functions.

Scottish arms industry

The paper says (p. 12):

reliance on defence exports is not a sustainable economic strategy and in the context of policy coherence it would be irresponsible to maintain an arms export control regime akin to the UK’s present one which involves selling to governments responsible for violations of international law and committing human rights abuses. Furthermore, the removal of Trident from the Clyde would negate a significant portion of the defence industrial base that has built up in Scotland to support it.

It is therefore inevitable that an independent Scotland would see a reduction in defence exports and a corresponding net contraction in its defence industry. This should not be seen as a cause for alarm however but rather as an opportunity to transition infrastructure and highly skilled workers into alternative areas of engineering and manufacturing.

Few, if any, countries have a perfect human rights record and, to put it bluntly if we refuse to sell them weapons, I'm sure others such as China will be happy to take up the slack. If a country, for example Saudi Arabia, buys lots of Chinese weapons, then they will become dependent on China for supplies of spare parts and compatible weapons, and China will want to keep selling them. Thus, there will be a convergence of interest between Saudi Arabia and China, resulting in Saudi Arabia becoming less aligned with the west and more aligned with China. This is absolutely not something Scottish (or Western more generally) foreign policy should encourage.

I also wonder whether the highly skilled workers are going to welcome being "transition[ed] into alternative areas of engineering and manufacturing". They well might not, and particularly in the early days of an independent Scotland, when our economy might be weak, we should not encourage skilled people to leave.

By focusing on innovation in areas of advanced engineering such as sensors, marine systems and robotics Scottish enterprises could maintain a qualitative edge against competitors not only in the defence sector but also in related civil sectors which utilise these technologies.

I would add that Scotland should focus on AI and drones. Indeed AI is going to be a big industry in the future and a Scottish AI industry should be encouraged.

Cost

The paper says (p. 12):

Annual operating costs would likely be within the £1.8 - 2.5 billion range depending on the fiscal realities facing an independent Scotland and the level of capability it opts to pursue.

I think that as a newly independent nation wishing to establish itself as a good global citizen (and European citizen) we should join NATO and whatever European defence organisations exist, at the time of independence. NATO recommends defence spending of a minimum of 2% of GDP.

UK GDP is about $3.1 trillion, and Scotland has 1/12 the the UK's population, so 2% of Scottish GDP would be about $5.2 billion, or £4.2 billion. This is about twice what the paper suggests; part of the difference is due to inflation, and also the world is a more threatening place in 2023 than in was in 2017. As I have said earlier, defence spending should go up and down in response to the threat level, and when it goes down it should do so in a way that preserves as much of our defence capability as possible.

Summary

What is the surest foundation for our defence? Relying on the courage and skill-at-arms of our soldiers backed by a determined and united population, or trusting the promises and good nature of foreign leaders such as Putin, Xi, Trump and Farage?

I think that question answers itself. Finland can defend itself with very capable armed forces costing 2% of GDP (incidentally Finland can field a larger army than the UK, even though they only have 1/12th the population), and Scotland could too.

See also

Perun has a video on defence strategy for small nations: